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Why it is on the listOne of the largest cyber thefts from a bank at the time, and proof that the global payment network itself could be misused by whoever controlled one connected computer.
In plain English
Banks around the world instruct each other to move money using a secure messaging system called SWIFT. A central bank had computers that were allowed to send those messages. Attackers took over those computers and sent their own orders.
The orders asked the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, where Bangladesh Bank kept dollars, to send money to accounts overseas. $81 million was paid out. Other orders were stopped.
The weak point was not the messaging system. It was the bank's own computers and processes.
Words used here
- SWIFT
- The messaging network banks use to instruct each other to move money.
- Spear-phishing
- A targeted email written to fool one specific person or team.
What happened
The US Justice Department says a group of North Korean hackers stole $81 million from Bangladesh Bank in February 2016. It says they first got into the bank's computers that were connected to the SWIFT system.
A 2021 indictment describes attempts from 2015 to 2019 to steal more than $1.2 billion from banks in several countries using fraudulent SWIFT messages. Those are the government's allegations.
Only part of the stolen money was ever recovered.
How it unfolded
- February 2016
Fraudulent payment orders are sent over SWIFT. Some are paid; others are stopped.
- September 2018
A US criminal complaint names a North Korean programmer in connection with the theft.
- February 2021
A wider US indictment describes bank heists across several countries.
Who was affected
Bangladesh Bank, and ultimately Bangladesh's national reserves.
What the response was
- The bank tried to stop and recall transfers, and some were blocked.
- SWIFT and banks worldwide tightened controls and added security requirements for connected computers.
What went wrong
- Computers that could send money orders were reachable by attackers.
- Controls that would have caught unusual orders quickly were weak.
What worked
- Some payments were stopped when other banks queried them.
What organisations should do differently
- Treat any computer that can move money as special: its own network, its own login, no web browsing.
- Require two people to approve large or unusual payments.
- Set up alerts for payments outside normal patterns.
What you can do today
- List who can approve payments and how. Add a second approver above a set amount.
- Turn on payment alerts and daily limits in every business bank account.
The lesson that still holds
Wherever money can move, assume someone will try to move it. Require two people, set limits, and watch for the unusual.
Sources
- North Korean regime-backed programmer charged (US Department of Justice)US Department of Justice, Sep 6, 2018
- Three North Korean military hackers indicted (US Department of Justice)US Department of Justice, Feb 17, 2021
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