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Post Mortem

Biggest cases ยท December 23, 2015

Ukraine 2015: the first blackout caused by a cyberattack

Attackers took remote control of operator screens at three power companies and switched off substations. About 225,000 customers lost power for hours.

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Details may change as reporting changes. Information comes from the linked sources, and we do not guarantee it is complete or current.

Why it is on the listIt was the first publicly acknowledged power outage caused by a cyberattack, and a model for how a state could switch off a grid.

In plain English

Power companies run their networks from control rooms. Attackers got into those control-room computers, probably through emails that carried malware, and spent months looking around first.

On the day, operators watched their own mouse pointers move on their screens as someone else opened circuit breakers one by one. They could not stop it. They also lost the call-centre and backup systems that would have helped.

Power came back within hours because engineers could switch things on by hand. That fallback is the reason this was a bad day and not a catastrophe.

Words used here

SCADA
The software used to monitor and control equipment in plants and power networks.
Substation
A site where electricity is switched and stepped down on its way to homes.
Manual operation
Running equipment by hand, in person, when the remote controls cannot be trusted.

What happened

The US government's ICS-CERT report, based on interviews with the companies, found remote intrusions at three regional power distribution companies, affecting approximately 225,000 customers.

Three other organisations were also intruded on but did not lose service. The attack appeared coordinated and the result of long reconnaissance.

The US Justice Department later charged six officers of Russia's military intelligence agency (GRU) over attacks including the Ukrainian grid attacks of 2015 to 2016. Charges are allegations.

How it unfolded

  1. Months before

    Attackers get a foothold and learn how the control systems work.

  2. December 23, 2015

    Breakers are opened remotely. Customers lose power. Backup systems and call centres are also disrupted.

  3. Within hours

    Staff drive to substations and restore power manually.

  4. February 2016

    ICS-CERT publishes its report on the incident.

Who was affected

About 225,000 customers in Ukraine, per the US report, for a period of hours. The companies ran in a reduced way for some time afterwards.

What the response was

  • Staff switched to manual operation to restore power.
  • US and Ukrainian agencies investigated and shared lessons with energy operators worldwide.

What went wrong

  • Corporate networks and control networks were not separated well enough.
  • Remote control could be taken over using normal operator tools.

What worked

  • Manual fallback procedures and trained staff restored power quickly.

What organisations should do differently

  • Keep control systems on a separate network from email and web browsing.
  • Require a second factor for any remote access into important systems.
  • Practise running the important thing by hand, and keep the people who know how.

What you can do today

  • Ask what happens in your organisation if the main system is down: who does the job by hand?
  • Check that nobody opens email on the same computer that controls something important.

The lesson that still holds

A good fallback turns a disaster into an inconvenience. Keep a way to run the essential thing without the clever system, and practise it.

Sources

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