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Post Mortem

Biggest cases ยท July 2020

Twitter 2020: a phone call and a Bitcoin scam

Attackers phoned Twitter staff, tricked a few into entering logins on a fake page, and took over about 130 high-profile accounts to run a Bitcoin scam.

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Details may change as reporting changes. Information comes from the linked sources, and we do not guarantee it is complete or current.

Why it is on the listSome of the world's best-known accounts, including political leaders and companies, were hijacked within hours, by people who mostly talked their way in.

In plain English

Twitter said it was a phone spear phishing attack. Callers pretended to be IT staff, told employees there was a problem with their VPN login, and steered them to a fake sign-in page that copied the real one.

With a few employees' details, the attackers reached the internal tools Twitter used to manage accounts, and posted a scam promising to double any Bitcoin sent to an address.

Words used here

Spear phishing
A trick aimed at one person or a small group, using real details to seem convincing.
VPN
A private connection staff use to reach company systems from outside the office.

What happened

Twitter reported on 15 July 2020 that attackers used a phone spear phishing attack on a small number of staff to get access to internal systems. Twitter has said little about the exact technique.

A Florida criminal affidavit said a 17-year-old, Graham Ivan Clark, hijacked 130 accounts. He was arrested on 31 July 2020, together with two others who were charged.

How it unfolded

  1. July 15, 2020

    Accounts of well-known people and companies post a Bitcoin scam.

  2. Same day

    Twitter locks the accounts and limits some internal tools.

  3. July 31, 2020

    Arrests are announced.

Who was affected

The owners of the hijacked accounts, their followers, and the people who sent money to the scam.

What the response was

  • Twitter locked down internal tools and reset affected accounts.
  • Police and the FBI investigated and made arrests within weeks.

What went wrong

  • Many staff had powerful internal access.
  • A convincing phone call was enough to get logins.

What worked

  • Fast action stopped the scam within hours and led to quick arrests.

What organisations should do differently

  • Use physical security keys for staff logins. They cannot be typed into a fake page.
  • Limit who can use powerful account-management tools, and log every use.

What you can do today

  • Never enter a login on a page you reached from a call or message. Go to the site yourself.
  • Turn on a second lock for your social media accounts.

The lesson that still holds

A trusted voice on the phone can open any door. Security keys and limited access make the difference.

Sources

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