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Why it is on the listIt was one of the first attacks to disrupt a whole country's online life on purpose, and it changed how governments and NATO think about cyber defence.
In plain English
Imagine a shop with one door. Now imagine a crowd of people who have no interest in buying anything, all squeezing through the door at once so real customers cannot get in. That is a denial-of-service attack, and when the crowd is made of thousands of hijacked computers it is a distributed one (DDoS).
Estonia had moved banking, government forms and voting online earlier than almost anyone. In spring 2007, after a row over moving a Soviet-era war memorial in Tallinn, waves of this fake traffic hit parliament, ministries, newspapers, internet providers and the biggest banks.
Nothing was stolen and nobody was hurt. The damage was that normal life online stopped working for hours at a time, in a country that depended on it.
Words used here
- DDoS
- A flood of junk requests, usually sent by many hijacked computers, that stops a website from answering real people.
- Botnet
- A network of hijacked computers, often home PCs, that an attacker can command together.
What happened
The attacks began at the end of April 2007 and ran for about three weeks. Targets included government and parliament portals, ministries, news outlets, internet providers and major banks, according to the analyses published by NATO's cyber centre and a NATO-affiliated research centre.
The traffic came mostly from botnets: ordinary computers around the world that had been infected, often without their owners knowing.
Estonia's government blamed Russia early on. Later, Estonia's defence minister said he had no evidence linking the attacks to the Russian government, and Russia denied involvement. Neither NATO nor European experts found proof of official Russian involvement. Who exactly organised it remains disputed.
How it unfolded
- April 26 to 27, 2007
Unrest in Tallinn over the relocation of a war memorial. The first online attacks follow.
- Early May 2007
Waves grow and reach banks and news sites.
- Mid-May 2007
Attacks fade after about three weeks as Estonian teams and foreign experts filter traffic and block sources.
- 2008 onward
NATO's Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence is set up in Tallinn.
Who was affected
Estonian government bodies, banks, media and internet users. Because so much daily life was online, nearly everyone in the country noticed.
What the response was
- Estonia's computer emergency team (CERT) worked with banks, providers and international partners to filter traffic.
- Some foreign traffic was blocked on purpose to keep domestic services running.
- Governments and NATO studied the attacks and built up shared cyber defence centres.
What went wrong
- Many services had been built for normal demand, with no plan for deliberate floods.
- There was no agreed way for governments to tell a nuisance from an act of war.
What worked
- Personal contacts between engineers at banks, providers and CERTs let them act faster than any formal process.
- Services recovered without data loss because the attack targeted availability, not secrets.
What organisations should do differently
- Know who your internet or hosting provider's emergency contact is before you need them.
- Put a content delivery network or DDoS shield in front of anything the public depends on.
- Keep a plain-text status page on a different provider so you can tell people what is happening.
What you can do today
- Write down the emergency contact for your host, domain registrar and DNS provider.
- Check that your public site sits behind a service that absorbs floods (many have a free tier).
- Decide how you would tell customers if your site were down for a day.
The lesson that still holds
Being online is a dependency. Know how you would keep working, and how you would talk to people, when the front door is blocked.
Sources
- Cyber Attacks Against Estonia (NATO StratCom COE)NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence
- Analysis of 2007 cyber attacks against Estonia from the information warfare perspectiveNATO CCDCOE, Ottis, 2008
- Russian group's claims reopen debate on Estonian cyberattacksRadio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
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